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There has been increased focus on the activities of audit committees due to high-profile cases of financial scandals 
unsettling business executives and organizations. A reliable audit report facilitated by an effective audit committee 
is now imperative in corporate organizations. Empirical and statistical evidence supports committee tenure, 
financial expertise, and independence as having significant direct correlation with audit committee effectiveness. 
However there is no statistical evidence proving that committee size and the frequency of committee meetings 
impact positively on audit committee effectiveness, as these are discretional, charter-based determinants. 
Therefore, to forestall the occurrence of anomalies in financial disclosures and to protect corporate reputation and 
diverse interests of various stakeholders, audit committees must be seen to have the power to probe, forensically 
and otherwise, management programs and other financial projects. In addition the audit committee has the 
corporate governance role to monitor, in stricter details, the activities of both Internal and External Audit to prevent 
biased and scandalous disclosures. The foregoing role of the committee is of utmost importance, as the credibility 
of financial statements remains the most accurate way of informing shareholders and other stakeholders about the 
financial performance, progress and position of the company.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
All over the world there has been cases of corporate financial scandals and abuse of power by top executives of 
organizations, leading to losses for investors.1 As a result there have been increased  demand for the establishment 
of effective audit committees.2 The audit committee’s role is one of oversight and monitoring, and in carrying out 
this responsibility, the committee may rely on management, the External Auditors, and any advisers the committee 
might engage, provided its reliance is reasonable.3 The audit committee is one of the operating committees of the 
board of directors of organizations saddled with the board responsibility for financial reporting and disclosures.4 
Membership, compensation and tenure of the committee is dependent on the charter of the company in question. 
The committee has the responsibility to oversee the firm’s financial, accounting reporting processes and 
preparation of the financial statement in compliance with regulatory standards and relevance statutes.5 Non –
executive Directors are usually inclusive in the membership of the audit committee, however where no audit 
committee exists in the establishment, the entire board of directors assumes audit committee responsibility. 
                                                           
1    See Robert Wearing, Cases in Corporate Governance, Sage Publications (London, Published by SAGE Publications Ltd., 2005) ISBN 
10: 1412908760 / ISBN 13: 9781412908764 .54. EBook available at< www.abebooks.com/Cases-Corporate-Governance-Robert-
Wearing>accessed 8 January 2015. The chairman of BCCI at the time was Clark Clifford, the former US Defense Secretary; The Bank was 
involved in massive money laundry and financial crime. For more details see <http://www. bibiliotecapleyades.net/socio-political/sociopol-
global banking>accessed February 2015. Poly Peck International (PPI) was a British Textile company, which under the leadership of Asil Nadir 
experienced unprecedented growth through acquisition and diversification. In 1982 it acquired 57% shares of Cornell, in 1983 purchased 71% 
stake in Santana Inc., in 1986 and 1987 it acquired majority shares in Impact textiles and Palm (UAE) respectively. In 1984 it diversified into 
electronics and acquired 82% ownership of Turkey electronics and in 1989 51% in Sanusi a Japanese electronics company. The CEO of Polly 
Peck International Asil Nadir was later convicted in 2012 for stealing over 29 million dollars from the company<www.dailymail.co.uk/jailed 
poly-peck-fraudsters>accessed 9 September 2014. Enron corporate governance scandal was the most notorious. It brought into prominence the 
importance of good corporate governance. Enron was an American energy company; it was one of the 10 largest companies in the US with 
over 22,000 staff strength. The company’s sudden collapse took the world by storm as it filed for bankruptcy in December 2001.Its sudden 
collapse was attributed to failures in corporate governance. For instance the executives permitted misleading treatment of transaction in 
company’s account, the Audit Committee gave approval of misleading sets of account and board was ineffective in supervising actions of 
senior executive and ignored warnings from whistleblowers. 
2 Pandit, G.M., Conway, G.M., and Baker, C.R. (2017). Audit Committee Requirements in Six Major Makets: How Far Have We Come? 
International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, February, Vol. 14, Iss. 1, pp. 30-61. 
3 The Role of Audit Committee. April 2018. https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/center-for-board-effectiveness/us-
audit-committee-resource-guide-section-2.pdf 
4 Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 2018, principle 11. Central Bank of Nigeria Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and Discount 
Houses in Nigeria 2014, section 2.5.1 
5 Verschoor, C.C. (2008). Audit Committee Essentials. USA: John Wiley & Sons. 
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Consequently, the effectiveness of audit committee have a rippling effect on board performance.  
Time is fast changing where board performance is evident mainly on choice of Chief Executives and 
protection of shareholders’ diverse interests. A core challenge is the integrity of the financial reports generated 
based on the internal and external audit processes. According to Copnell, greater pressure is placed on audit 
committees due to changes in corporate cultures, shortage of key talents in the finance function, the new global 
control environment, and changes in legal and regulatory compliance environments. 1  The study by KPMG 
concluded that risk management is a serious concern to audit committees.2 Other concerns include the tone at the 
top, short-termism, Chief Financial Officer’s (CFO) succession planning and competence in the finance function, 
and poor understanding of the firm’s business.3 In spite of frequent development in technology such as computer 
assisted audit technique, internet, automated accounting system etc, financial scandals in both public and private 
organizations still top the headlines of Nigerian newspapers on daily basis.4  
Business operations are required to be reported using internal and external financial reporting standards given 
by regulators. More so information disclosed by organizations form part of the requirements for investments, 
lending, regulation, and policymaking. 5  However in the absence of a well-regulated financial reporting 
environment, the outcome of a firm’s financial position may be under-reported, giving exaggerated assumptions 
of firm value and efficiency, with severe consequences to the user of the information.6 Regulators and investors 
do not only care about the information produced but also how the information is made available and the audit 
committee plays a vital role in this regard. The form of the information can be deceptive, especially if a financial 
statement bears a footnote projected as earnings of the company rather than additional information to justify the 
earnings. In an under-regulated environment, it is not impossible to see disparate financial information content and 
variances in the ways financial information is disclosed.7 Studies show that organizations doing the right things 
disclose quality information faster than firms fabricating financial reports8 and using more than necessary external 
auditors and analysts9 whose activities are marred by a lack of objectivity, partiality, and corporate connivance in 
information disclosure scandals. 10  Fraudulent organizations have been observed to exhibit enormous 
inconsistencies between revenue growth reported and growth in revenue-related non-financial metrics such as 
number of employees, stores, and patents.11  
The purpose of this paper is to review key literature to espouse the perceptions of the effectiveness of audit 
committees from the practice-theory perspective.12 The study design involves collecting secondary data available 
in the public domain to evaluate the effectiveness of audit committees. First, the study reviews the practice of audit 
committees within their role as members of boards of directors. Next, a review of literature is undertaken to bring 
into perspective the descriptions and behavior of audit committees in their independent function of monitoring 
financial reporting and strengthening corporate governance.13 The paper examines audit committees’ best practices 
against what they actually do. It measures the relationship between what they do and what is expected of them 
within the framework of their roles and expectations from key stakeholders. In addition, this paper scrutinizes the 
legal framework of the audit committee as provided by relevant laws and codes of governance in Nigeria. Some 
of such laws and codes includes The Company and Allied matters Act (CAMA) 2011, Security and Exchange 
Commission Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies (SEC Code 2011) 2011, the Financial 
Reporting Council of Nigeria Act 2011 and the most recent Codes which are the Nigerian National Code of 
Corporate Governance 2018 (NCCG) and the Code of Conduct for Microfinance Banks 2018. 
 
                                                           
1  Copnell, T. (2016).Four Key Challenges for Global Audit Committees. UK: Audit Committee Institute, KPMG LLP. 
https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/04/Four%20Key%20Challenges.pdf. Accessed on May 14, 2018. 
2 https://home.kpmg/us/en/home/media/press-releases/2017/01/risk-management-tops-audit-committee-concerns.html 
3 Partiban, J., Gajula, R., and Cardwell, F. (2017). Is Everything Under Control? Audit Committee Challenges and Priorities. 2017 Global Audit 
Committee Pulse Survey. KMPG’s Audit Committee Institute. Bahrain: KMPG Fakhra. 
https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/bh/pdf/2017-global-audit-committee-pulse-survey.pdf. Accessed on May 14, 2018. 
4 Thisday Newspaper , 16th Oct., 2006 and  Sunday Punch June 26, 2011, page 1  
5 Gunn, J. (2007). XBRL: Opportunities and Challenges in Enhancing Financial Reporting and Assurance Processes. Current Issues in Auditing, 
Vol. 1, pp. A36-A43. 
6 Guay, W. and Verrecchia, R. (2018).Conservative Disclosure.Financial Reporting.In Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2308/jfir-52051. 
7  Hirshleifer, D. and Teoh, S.H. (2003).Limited Attention, Information Disclosure, and Financial Reporting.Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 36, pp. 337-386. 
8  Abernathy, J.L., Kubick, T.R., and Masli, A. (2018).Evidence on the Relation between Managerial Ability and Financial Reporting 
Timeliness.International Journal of Auditing, February 19. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12112. 
9 Young, A. (2018). Do Analysts affect Bad News Timeliness? Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 48, Iss. 2, pp. 171-189. 
10 Clatworthy, M. and Lee, E. (2018).Financial Analysts’ Role in Valuation and Stewardship.Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 48, No. 
1, pp. 1-4. 
11 Brazel, J.F. and Schmidt, J.J. (2018). Do Auditors and Audit Committees Lower Fraud Risk by Constraining Inconsistencies between 
Financial and Non-Financial Measures? Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory.In Press. https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-52087. 
12 Brennan, N. and Kirwan, C.E. (2015). Audit Committees: Practices, Practitioners and Praxis of Governance. Accounting, Auditing, and 
Accountability Journal, January, Vol. 28, Iss. 4, pp. 466-493. 
13 Beasley, M.S., Carcello, J.V., Hermanson, D.R., and Neal, T.L. (2010).The Audit Committee Oversight Process. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, Spring, Vol. 26, Iss. 1, pp. 65-122. 
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2. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
The Board, being central in corporate governance and one of highest governing body in the company, is expected 
to have a charter setting out its responsibilities. 1  Boards of directors are key formations of the governance 
architecture of organizations. A Board ( specifically in Nigeria) is expected to have a Chairman, the position which 
should be distinct and separate from that of the Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer, hence no two persons 
should combine the two offices.2 Furthermore neither the Chairman nor the MD/CEO should serve as chairman of 
any of the Board committees including the audit committee.3 The Board owes the company fiduciary duties and 
duties of care and skill, it is in carrying out these duties towards the company that their roles as board audit 
committee arise. 
 Advances in economic theory propose that board of directors is saddled with the responsibility to secure 
enduring performance for the entity.4 The size of the board is immaterial to the value expected from the members.5 
Therefore; board effectiveness is a function of the individual members of the body. Prior research brought evidence 
of the influence of board composition for bringing strategic resources for innovation, as well as evidence of 
positive outcomes of board diversity.6 
Being appointed as a director to the board of a company is a mark of a top management career. A company 
director is a person duly appointed by the company to direct and manage the business of the company.7   A director 
is the alter ego of a company, a corporate governor in charge of the affairs of a company. Directors of a company 
registered under the CAMA are persons duly appointed by the company to direct and manage the business of the 
company. CAMA describes a director to include any person occupying the position of director by whatever name 
called; and includes any person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the company 
are accustomed to act.8  
 
3. BOARD AND AUDIT COMMITTEE  
Directors are engaged in various committees, such as audit, nominating, compensation, and executive committees, 
as they perform the responsibilities of their offices. Directors are sourced internally and externally based on 
competencies and experience possessed. Directors sourced internally typically are current or former employees of 
the firm. These have impressive knowledge of the organization and have generously risen through the ranks, 
serving in various capacities in the firm. Usually, directors are enticed with equity ownership, performance-based 
fees and other emoluments to improve their welfare, status, and focus on driving company performance.9 The 
Chief Executive Officer exerts relative influence over the board of directors. This relativity results from factors 
such as board size, number of non-executive directors, number of Independent directors,  the number of board 
meetings, the existence of all executive committees etc.10 
To ensure effectiveness in the running of the company, the board has been empowered by numerous codes of 
corporate governance in Nigeria to establish board committees. A good example of such code is the National Code 
of Corporate Governance (NCCG) 2018 which empowers the board to delegate its powers and duties to properly 
structured sub-committees usually known as board committees. 11 These committees may include remuneration 
committee, risk management committee, audit committee, nomination and governance committee. 12  Only 
directors are required to be members of board committees, although members of senior management may be 
required to attend board committee meetings, provide support and advisory role and carry out certain task to 
facilitate the attainment of committee responsibilities.13 Board committees are accountable to the board for their 
activities and performance. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and 
Discount Houses 2014 also provides for the creation of board committees.  In Section. 2.5.5 of the code it provides 
that the Board should establish at a minimum the following Committees:  (i) a committee responsible for the 
oversight of Risk Management and Audit functions and (ii)  a Board Governance and Nominations Committee. 
                                                           
1. Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 2018 Principle 1 
2 Central Bank of Nigeria Code of Corporate Governance 2014, section 2.3. similar provision in the NCCG 2018, section 2.7  
3 Central Bank of Nigeria Code of Corporate Governance 2014,  section 2.5.3. similar provision in the NCCG 2018, section 2.9 
4 Baysinger, B.D. and Butler, H.N. (1985). Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board 
Composition. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organisation, Vol. 1, No.1,pp. 101-124. 
5 Yermack, D. (1996). Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors.Journal of Financial Economics, February, Vol. 
40, Iss. 2, pp. 185-211. 
6 Fabrice Galia and Emmanuel Zenou  ‘Does board diversity influence innovation? The impact of gender and age diversity on innovation types’ 
Clermont-Ferrand, 10-12 , June 2013 
7 Company And Allied Matters Act , section244 
8 ibid 
9 Yermack, D. Supra 
10 Lara, J.M.G., Osma, B.G., and Penalva, F. (2007). Board of Directors’ Characteristics and Conditional Accounting Conservatism: Spanish 
Evidence. European Accounting Review, April 08, Vol. 16, Iss. 4, pp. 727-755. 
11Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance, 2018 Principle 11, 2018. 
12 ibid 
13 Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance,  2018.principle  11.1.2 
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The Nigerian Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) Code 2011 for Public Companies in addition to the 
statutory audit committee required by the CAMA, provides that every public company through its board may 
establish an internal audit committee.1  The code stipulates that at least one board member of the committee should 
be financially literate, 2 however the Nigerian code recommends that all Members of the committee should be 
basic financially literate and should be able to read financial statements, at least one member should be a financial 
expert have current knowledge in accounting and financial management.3 This goes to show that the composition 
of the board audit committee affects its effectiveness whether positively or negatively in carrying out its duties. 
The SEC Code 2011 further mandates companies who refuse to establish an internal audit committee, to disclose 
sufficient reasons in the company’s annual report with an explanation as to how assurance of effective internal 
processes and systems, such as risk management, internal control will be obtained.4  
Without prejudice to the extant laws on statutory audit committee, the NCCG 2018 prescribes also that it is 
desirable for every company to have a board audit committee responsible for the oversight function of audit.5 The 
members of the board should be financially literate and should be able to read and understand financial statement. 
It also provides that at least one member of the committee should be a financial expert, have current knowledge in 
accounting and financial management, and be able to interpret financial statements.6 The NCCG 2018 Code which 
is all encompassing, applies to companies of various sizes and types, stipulates that for private companies, 
members of the board audit committee should be Non-Executive Directors and a majority of them should be 
Independent Non-Executive Directors where possible. This provision is similar to that of CBN Code 2014 which 
states that board audit committee should be structured in such a way that it consists only of Non-Executive 
Directors; chaired by an independent Director; and has at least three members.7 This is to aid the process of 
transparency in the accounting/auditing process of the company. Due to the aforementioned provisions, the audit 
committee can check the activities of the company and its officers including the executive directors, for errors and 
fraudulent activities. The presence of independent directors on the audit committee increases trust in the financial 
information turned out by the committee, this is because independent directors are “independent” of the company 
and can make decisions without fear or favor.  
From existing law and codes, it is now established that there are two categories of audit committees 
recognized in Nigeria. The first is the statutory audit committee which is compulsory for every company under the 
CAMA and it is sometimes referred to as the external audit committee. The second category of audit committee is 
the internal audit committee is also called the board audit committee. The internal or board audit committee which 
has been recommended by SEC CODE 2011, CBN Code 2014 and more recently the NCCG 2018. The CBN Code 
2014 provides that the internal board committee for banks and other financial institutions is to be headed by Non-
Executive Directors and must not include the chairman of the board.8 It is fast becoming the practice for a Nigerian 
company especially public companies, to have a two tier audit committee alongside independent auditors, It is 
believed that this will translate into higher audit quality, improved risk management environment, and higher 
professional fees to be borne by the firm.9 It is important to note as earlier mentioned, that Section 359 of the 
CAMA only provides for one audit committee which is the statutory audit committee. It prescribes that the 
committee be made up of an equal number (maximum of six) of representatives of shareholders and directors.   
Onyabe et al opine that audit committee tenure has no significant effect on the quality of audit reports and 
the general effectiveness of the committee.10 Drawing a parallel between tenure and audit committee fees, Schrader 
observed positive direct correlation, suggesting that the effectiveness of the audit committee has a link to the tenure 
of its members. The foregoing disparity notwithstanding, Ghafran recommend that to achieve a more effective 
audit committee, the committee should work with management to ensure that a significant negative association 
that results in delays and lag periods in financial reporting timeliness is eliminated.11  
 In Nigeria today, for a company to be listed on Stock Exchanges, an audit committee is mandatory.12 Whilst 
CAMA permits the chairman of the board audit committee to maintain basic financial and accounting knowledge,13 
                                                           
1 Section 9.2  
2 Section 30.1 and 2  
3 NCCG 2018, section 11.4.2 
4 Section 31.1 
5 Section 11.4.1 
6 Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 2018 Principle 11.4.2 
7 See section 2.5.2, Central Bank of Nigeria Code 2014 
8 Section 2.5.4 CBN Code of Corporate Governance 2014. 
9 Rani, A. (2018). Audit Committee Effectiveness: Relationship between Audit Committee Characteristics and Audit Fees and Non-Audit 
Service Fees. Journal of Commerce and Accounting Research, Vol. 7, Iss.3, pp.35-44. 
10 Onyabe, J.M., Okpanachi, J., Nyor, T., Yahaya, O.A., and Ahmed, M. (2018).Effect of Audit Committee Tenure on Financial Reporting 
Quality of Listed Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria.European Scientific Journal, February, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 257-271. 
11 Ghafran, C. and Yasmin, S. (2018). Audit Committee Chair and Financial Reporting Timeliness: A Focus on Financial, Experiential and 
Monitoring Expertise. International Journal of Auditing, March, Vol. 22, Iss. 1, pp. 13-24. 
12 http://www.nse.com.ng/issuers/listing-your-company/listing-requirements Accessed 29/3/ 2019 
13 See section 359 of CAMA 
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the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria maintains that for consistency and reliability of financial statements 
reported in annual reports and other documents of a financial nature, members of the audit committee must  possess 
membership of a professional accounting body in Nigeria.1  
This paper however aligns with the view of Krishnan, His view is that appointment of experts onto audit 
committee is more likely to enhance monitoring. Furthermore that it signals that investors are likely to perceive 
the firm as credible and serious in its commitment to disclosure of quality information necessary for investments 
and policymaking.2 
 
AUDIT COMMITTEE RESPONSIBILITIES 
The role of audit committees in the monitoring financial reporting of a firm’s business is of concern to the public, 
regulators and investors.3 Audit committees are set up to forestall the occurrence of anomalies in corporate 
governance, thus protecting the reputation of firms and interests of various stakeholder groups. They achieve this 
by questioning management’s financial judgments, probing every project and program to determine the 
appropriateness of budgets and allocations4  
Audit committees perform the function of whistle-blowers in their drive to ensure that financial disclosures 
are made and resolved using internal mechanisms without the probability of reporting internal misconducts 
externally.5 However, there is an overlapping function as audit committees perform the function of enterprise risk 
management, especially in adequately depicting and reporting financial valuations, estimates and other accounting 
inputs of businesses.6 Other duties include integrated reporting of sustainability information to ensure harmony 
with other relevant internal data.7 It is however important to note that the SEC Code 2011, CBN Code 2014 and  
Code of Corporate Governance for Micro Finance Banks and other Financial Institutions 2018 have similar 
provisions on the responsibilities of audit committees.8  
The NCCG Code 2018 stipulates some of the responsibilities of audit committees thus; ascertaining whether 
the accounting and reporting policies of the company are in accordance with legal requirements and agreed ethical 
practices, make recommendations to the board regarding the appointment, removal and remuneration of the 
external auditors of the company. 9 Furthermore, the board audit committee shall authorize the internal auditor to 
carry out investigations into any activities of the company which may be of interest or concern to the committee.  
 
MEASURES OF AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS 
The board (including the audit committee), management (including the internal audit function), and the external 
auditor all have distinct roles to play in financial reporting, however, the focus of this paper is on the role of board 
audit committee. The audit committee has the responsibility to ascertain whether the accounting and reporting 
policies of the Company are in accordance with legal requirements and agreed ethical practices,  review the scope 
and planning of audit requirements, keep under review the effectiveness of the Company's system of accounting 
and internal control, make recommendations to the Board regarding the appointment, removal and remuneration 
of the external auditors of the Company, exercise oversight over management’s processes to ascertain the integrity 
of the Company’s financial statements, ensure company’s compliance with all applicable legal and other regulatory 
requirements for financial reporting and disclosures. In addition, the audit committee also review performance and 
exercise oversight function of the Company’s internal audit and external auditor’s functions, ensure the 
development of a comprehensive internal control framework for the Company, review and ensure that adequate 
whistle-blowing policies and procedures are in place. Audit committee is also responsible for developing policy 
on the nature, extent and terms under which the external auditors may perform non-audit services and review the 
independence of the external auditors in line with corporate governance best practices. 
According to DeZoort et al, the effectiveness of audit committees hinges on the qualification of its members 
                                                           
1 See section 359 (3) and (6) of CAMA Cap. C20. See also Egwuatu, P. (2017).What CAMA Says on Audit Committee Membership. Vanguard, 
February 20. Available at: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/02/cama-says-audit-committee-membership/. Accessed on April 30, 2018. 
2 Krishnan, G.V. and Visvanathan, G. (2008). Does the SOX Definition of an Accounting Expert Matter? The Association between Audit 
Committee Directors’ Accounting Expertise and Accounting Conservatism.Constemporary Accounting Research, Fall, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 827-
857. 
3 Kalelkar, R., Khan, S., and Park, S.J. (2018). Excess Audit Committee Compensation and Audit Pricing.International Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing and Performance Evaluation, Vol. 14, Iss.2-3, pp. 159-182, https://doi.org/10.1504/IJAAPE.2018.091062. 
4 McMullen, D.A. and Raghunandan, K. (1996).Enhancing Audit Committee Effectiveness.Journal of Accountancy, August, Vol. 182, Iss. 2, 
pp. 79-81. 
5 Lee, G. and Fargher, N.L. (2018).The Role of the Audit Committee in their Oversight of Whistle-Blowing.AUDITING: A Journal of Practice 
and Theory, February, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 167-189. 
6 Cohen, J., Krishnamoorthy, G., and Wright, A. (2017). Enterprise Risk Management and the Financial Reporting Process: The Experiences 
of Audit Committee Members, CFOs and External Auditors. Contemporary Accounting Research, Summer, Vol. 34, Iss. 2, pp. 1178-1209. 
7 Chariri, A. and Januarti, I. (2017). Audit Committee Characteristics and Integrated Reporting: Empirical Study of Companies Listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. European Research Studies Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 4B, pp. 305-318. 
8 See Sections 2.5 CBN Code, Section 30 Code of corporate Governance for Public Companies, 
9 Principle 11. NCCG 2018 
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and the authority and resources provided by the commissioning firm to carry out their broad functions that secures 
stakeholders’ interests through diligent oversight function.1  In addressing audit committee effectiveness, the 
authors’ model highlights the key inputs that facilitate audit committee effectiveness process, and the expected 
output. The key determinants of audit committee effectiveness include the committee’s composition (expertise, 
independence, tenure, etc.), authority (roles and influence), and resources (e.g., access to management, external 
and internal auditors). The three broad inputs require diligence on the part of the committee for effectiveness. 
Turley and Zaman found that the informal networks formed by audit committee members are preconditions of the 
committee’s success and that the success of the job process of the committee lies on the firm’s formal governance 
structures and accounting processes.2 
Audit committee tenure has become the focus of several debates. The resulting dilemma is that the firm is 
faced with the decision of whether to replace its audit committee members after a short period of time or to build 
and maintain a long-term tenure. The outcomes are quite conflicting. While some researchers have identified 
negative relationship between audit committee tenure and financial reporting quality3 others argue on positive 
relationship between audit committee tenure and financial reporting quality.4 Prolonged tenure ordinarily leads to 
familiarity between the audit committee members and the external auditors and also between the audit committee 
members and those responsible for the internal audit in the company. Where too much familiarity exist, it is likely 
to erode objectivity and create bias on the audit committee review of internal audit and external audit function. 
The study by Alqatamin focused on companies listed on Amman Stock Exchange. It found that audit 
committee performance is a function of the committee size, its independence, and gender diversity.5 As the hope 
of all investors and corporate accountability, audit committees are smaller in size compared to the size of the board 
of directors. The Security and Exchange(SEC) of the U.S., in 1999, proposed a 3-man audit committee comprised 
of independent directors who exert no influence over management and the firm and vice versa. In 2002, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United States upheld and legislated the proposed SEC audit committee size into Law 
in Section 301 of the Act.6 
In studying the effectiveness of audit committees, Alqatamin compared audit committee characteristics with 
return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and net interest margin (NIM) of Turkish and United Kingdom 
banks. The following audit committee characteristics were evaluated – audit committee size, members 
independence, frequency of meetings, financial expertise, level of education, age, experience, and gender. The 
study found that the issue of frequency of meeting is usually discretionary and is determined by the levels of 
ownership of the firm, the size of the committee, its level of independence and financial expertise, especially when 
the risk of disclosing bad financial information is apparent.7 Another study on audit committee effectiveness of 
quoted Pharmaceutical companies in Nigeria shows improvement in financial reporting timeliness8 whereas the 
effectiveness of audit committees does not translate to improvement in the value of deposit money banks in the 
country.9 Also statistically insignificant is the number of meetings of the committee when measured against the 
quality of financial reporting of listed Nigerian Banks on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.10 
The study by Modum, Ugwoke, and Onyeanu observed that the quality of audit committee composition 
supports improved corporate governance rather than just having a committee in place.11 The study found that more 
than 80% of audit committees in Nigeria’s non-financial sector are weakly constituted with majority of the 
members lacking expertise in finance and financial reporting standards and insufficient knowledge of their 
organizations. 
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The effectiveness of financial reports is measured against financial reporting standards, whilst audit 
committee characteristics, its compliance to standards of reporting, financial literacy, and independence highlight 
the committee’s effectiveness in promoting corporate integrity.1 The avoidance of biased metrics in accrual 
measurements provides insights into how audit committees control firm earnings and tracks erroneous earnings 
from being entered into financial statements.2 Financial expertise and relative status of the committee have also 
been promoted as the ideal for audit committee effectiveness, especially when faced with conflicting goals and 
drive to influence outcomes. The quest to deepen accrual, personnel and external auditor monitoring quality has 
led to improvement in audit committee compensation which has introduced effectiveness in corporate governance.3 
However, to enhance monitoring and risk avoidance on key audit matters, there is increased call for improvement 
in the percentage of women on audit committees.4 There is also a call to focus on external auditors to prevent the 
delivery of a poorly reported financial outlook.5 
Besides the traditional approaches above, audit committee diligence has been measured against the frequency 
of meetings held.6 The committee size has been observed to exert measurable influence on the quality of audits.7 
Besides the committee size, the authors also provided insight into CEO/Chair’s dual roles on the Board and audit 
committee as a measure of the committee’s effectiveness. A key determinant of audit committee members’ role 
effectiveness is their behavior and approach toward evolving quality audit. Members’ behaviors is measured 
against transparency and collaborative tendencies8 which contribute to audit committee’s diligence just the way 
the committee’s tenure and earnings quality have been explored as a measure of its effectiveness in delivering 
quality financial audits.9 The study by Lawrence et al found that independence and ctivity level of the committee 
impacts on its effectiveness.10 While using units of measurement is sufficiently cumbersome in understudying 
audit committee characteristics and effectiveness, using a combination of measurement parameters explores 
greater corporate governance mechanisms in more detail, thus exposing, effectively, the impact of audit 
committees on the demand for audit quality.11  
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of financial reporting is to provide high quality financial information about economic entities that 
can be useful when making economic decisions. Audit committees play very important roles in organizations to 
secure their integrity and position them for improved investor confidence. Members of the audit committee must 
be questioned whether they carried out their duties and obligations with due care and diligence. Notwithstanding 
the independence which the audit committee is meant to possess, they are answerable to the board and the 
shareholders of the company hence they must be checked to ensure that their duties and responsibilities towards 
the company are not lacking. Advanced audit skills are required of professionals to cope with the fast changing 
world of globalization and advancement in information technology12. Without the committees focus, many firms 
have been marred by corporate scandals involving boards of directors manipulation of financial statements for 
selfish interests. The need for increased monitoring and appointment of financial experts have been thought of and 
promulgated as laws in many countries as prerequisites for being listed on stock exchanges. However, there is 
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increased need to understand the workings of audit committees, as business environments, including regulations 
change. Audit committees are constituted to strengthen corporate governance, protect firm image and investor 
confidence. As whistleblowers, they probe projects and programs of management and activities of external auditors, 
to determine the appropriateness of budgets and accruals. As risk managers, they report on financial valuations, 
estimates and related financial management to enhance integrated reporting. Audit committees should show a high 
level of understanding of the company’s business, be independent of the company and approach their work with a 
high level of objectivity and professionalism all the while applying internationally accepted audit standards in their 
work1. The characteristics of members should be evaluated to determine how individual behavioral traits affect 
how crucial decisions are taken in the committee. So much work has been done in understudying their financial 
expertise, independence, conformity to local and foreign financial reporting standards, and compensation, in the 
quest to clarify compliance and effectiveness. Questions have been raised on the committees diversity with claims 
that including women on the committee yields increased risk avoidance and monitoring depth. However, in 
measuring the effectiveness of audit committees it is important to track firm earnings and avoid use of biased 
metrics. The observation from this study points to the fact that the public needs reliable audit reports and it can 
only be achieved in an atmosphere where the concept of integrity, objectivity, independence and fairness are not 
threatened, hence the gender of the members of the committee is irrelevant while checking effectiveness. There 
has also been increased focus on audit committee tenure, frequency of meeting, and size, as it is believed that the 
longer the members remain on the job the more experience and expertise developed which translates to quality 
reporting of financial dealings of organizations. The smaller the committees size the more the focus on effective 
governance. The frequency of meetings held by the committee each financial year is discretionary with no 
significant impact on the effectiveness of the committee.    
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